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eorgia’s Rose Revolution of 2003 signalled the beginning of a new era for the former 
Soviet Union Republic. The triumphant new political elite, headed by President 
Mikheil Saakashvili, vowed to establish a democratic state characterised by respect 
for human rights, corruption-free government and a functioning market economy seeking 
integration with Europe and eventual EU membership. For the most part the West has been 
supportive of the new government. Although the EU made it clear that the membership 
perspective was not on the table, it has provided assistance for the ongoing reforms. 
Almost a decade after the revolution, however, we find a state in which overreliance on 
political personalities, as opposed to democratic state institutions, has remained the norm. 
And the personality credited with leading Georgia to the path of democracy may end up 
undermining the very process he once started.   
In autumn 2012 and spring 2013, Georgians go to the polls again to vote in parliamentary 
and presidential elections that will be crucial for the country’s declared reform and 
democratisation agenda. Meanwhile, the Georgian government is yet to convince both its 
allies and its critics that the reforms championed since 2003 have been all-inclusive, and not 
solely for the benefit of the political elite. President Saakashvili’s second and final 
presidential term ends in 2013; after this Georgia will move to a parliamentary system in 
which the prime minister will have increased powers. The question in the minds of many is 
whether the young Saakashvili will try to stay at the helm of Georgian politics after his 
presidential term, and if he does what this might mean for Georgian democracy. 
The road to modernisation 
Young Georgian revolutionaries inherited a semi-failed state with criminality, endemic 
corruption and a broken tax collection system. The World Bank report nevertheless details 
certain important political and economic reforms that were undertaken by Saakashvili’s 
government, such as combating petty corruption, criminality, eradicating the so-called 
‘thieves-in-law’ elements in society and improving public sector services. Many efforts were 
also made to attract foreign investments through easing taxation, modernising infrastructure 
and building cities and motorways.  
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On the other hand, corruption at the highest political levels has not been tackled adequately. 
There is a lack of transparency in spending, and little accountability in the presidential 
administration and ruling party. Critics also point out that in order to set up a successful big 
business in Georgia, close links to the political elite are a necessity. Moreover, a ‘zero 
tolerance’ policy towards criminality and low-level corruption has resulted in one of the 
largest prison populations in the world. Such problems can only be addressed when all 
governmental branches function well, and this is far from the case in Georgia. 
Trias politica: a strong executive versus a weak legislature and judiciary 
While succeeding in a number of reforms towards modernisation, Georgia has lagged behind 
in its democratisation process. The executive branch of the government principally 
dominates the weak legislature and judiciary, thus undermining the trias politica principle of 
a separation of powers and the independence of the different branches of state.  
Party politics are all but non-existent in Georgia, and the authorities have not encouraged 
political pluralism. The parliament has been dominated by the ruling United National 
Movement party since most of the opposition parties refused to enter parliament and 
renounced their mandates after the 2008 elections.  As things stand now, the parliament does 
not effectively scrutinise the executive and it remains unchecked and unaccountable. 
The dominance of one party since 2003 is partly because Georgian opposition parties have 
been unable to pull together and present any real alternative. Georgian billionaire Bidzina 
Ivanishvili declared his ambition to enter Georgian politics in October 2011 and has managed 
to unite a number of opposition parties around his ‘Georgian Dream’ movement. Many in 
Georgia and abroad are sceptical of this union, however, which is yet to come forward with a 
credible political agenda.  
Moreover, the third branch of government, the Georgian judiciary, is not only weak but 
discredited. It has a number of structural problems, such as the appointment and 
reassignment of judges, whose professionalism is in any case questionable. However, the 
most troubling flaw in the judicial system is its dependence on the government. This raises 
serious questions about the Georgian regime’s commitment to human rights and the rule of 
law. According to the UN human rights experts report (2011), the acquittal rate in all legal 
trials is 0.1% in Georgia. This, in conjunction with harsh sentencing and the role of the 
prosecutor, would suggest arbitrary detention.  
Who will sound the fire alarm? 
Besides the lack of ‘traditional’ checks and balances, Georgian democracy also suffers from 
the absence of any viable ‘fire alarm’ oversight. Although the virtual space, such as online 
TV, blogs and social networks are relatively free, the major TV companies are controlled by 
the ruling party and are clearly manipulated for political ends. Freedom House’s latest 
report rates the Georgian media as “partially free.” The three pro-government TV channels 
with national coverage – Public Broadcaster, Rustavi 2 and Imedi TV, broadcast soviet-style 
propaganda that herald the achievements of the government. Maestro and Kavkasia TV 
channels, which have been rather critical of the government, only cover the capital city area.  
Moreover, trade unions are weak in Georgia because employees fear that joining a union will 
cost them their job. Employees’ rights were traded for the ‘liberalisation’ of the economy and 
the desire to attract foreign investors, which has made hiring and firing easy for companies. 
As a result, labour law, social protection and employment rights are non-existent in Georgia.  
Nevertheless, Georgian civil society seems to have overcome the crisis and brain drain it 
suffered after 2003, when many activists became absorbed by the new regime. Independent 
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civil society organisations are now gaining momentum again and are set to play a crucial 
role in the run-up to the parliamentary and presidential elections. The “It Affects You Too” 
campaign, uniting a number of NGOs and monitoring electoral process has already achieved 
some results. This is particularly important in the absence of credible state institutions, free 
media and any substantive debate between government and opposition, which have both 
focused on smear campaigns rather than viable political agendas. 
What European future for Georgia? 
The Rose Revolution government is sparing no effort to convince the EU that ‘too much’ 
democracy could be dangerous for reform in the country. The government argues that in 
order to make the already enacted reforms sustainable, a strong executive power has to be 
maintained. This paradox does not sit well with the norms and values that are adhered to 
and promoted by the EU and its member states.   
Moreover, among the host of reasons cited as the basis for the success of reforms, Georgian 
authorities often trumpet their ‘liberal’ regulatory framework. However, the problem with 
this ‘libertarian’ approach is that it too is incompatible with that of the EU and calls into 
question the rhetoric about prioritising EU integration. The start of the Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) negotiations with the EU has raised Georgia’s 
profile and attracted foreign investment in the short term. However, it also puts pressure on 
the Georgian government to move towards regulatory convergence with the EU in a mid- to 
long-term perspective, which somewhat inconveniently will require a more conservative 
regulatory framework. 
The new era heralded by the Rose Revolution in Georgia has seen important reforms and 
substantial progress. However, with elections around the corner, the Georgian government 
is yet to embark on the process of democratisation and Europeanisation that will create 
effective checks and balances across its governmental branches, and facilitate greater civic 
activism. President Saakashvili’s leaving high politics after his final term will not guarantee 
democracy in itself. It will demonstrate, however, that a change in command is possible and 
that state institutions are more important than the personalities occupying them; a realisation 
of the norms that the EU views as being an integral part of the democratic process. 
